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1 Introduction
It is very rare to find in a single person both the qualities of a remarkable
scientific mind and of a wonderful human being. With this tribute to Jean-Yves
Jaffray, we hope to convince the reader of his outstanding creativity and vision,
of the coherence of his work, and of its relevance for some topics in decision
theory that are currently under lively debate.
As a scientist, Jean-Yves Jaffray can be characterized by one main insight
and one main concern. His main insight is that a sound decision theory must
explicitly use all the information available to the decision maker. This infor-
mation about events must further be treated in a strictly objective manner. In
the models he proposed as a result, objective information can be disentangled
from subjective attitudes with respect to this information.1 For that purpose,
before asking how to represent preferences, one must wonder how to treat and
represent the given information.
Jean-Yves’ main concern in designing his models is that they must be
tractable, implementable and testable. This leads him to emphasize the sim-
plicity of the models he puts forward, including the way the arrival of new
information is modeled, and to develop experiments to test them. This adher-
ence to objectivity together with his concern for implementable models fits well
with Jean-Yves’ applied work in statistics and computer science that we will
not review here.
After some words on his early contributions, we will discuss the way he
addressed different questions linked to Decision Theory : How to describe in-
formation (or lack of information) on events? How to model decisions in this
framework? How to evaluate decisions? How to update in the presence of new
∗French Group of Decision Theory
1For a discussion of this idea, see Giraud and Tallon, (2010), and Wakker (2010).
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information ? How to test each model experimentally ? We will discuss these
questions in turn.
2 Early contributions : Jean-Yves and Utility
Theory
Jean-Yves started his research in the 70’s by studying Utility Theory. His Ph.D.
thesis (Jaffray, 1974a), written under the supervision of Jean Ville, a disciple of
Borel, is entitled ”Existence, Proprie´te´s de Continuite´, Additivite´ de Fonctions
d’Utilite´ sur un Espace Partiellement ou Totalement Ordonne´”. As stated in
the title, he generalized and extended several results of Debreu and others on
utility theory. He published three papers from his Ph.D. thesis: Jaffray (1974b)
in Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Jaffray (1975a) in Econometrica and
Jaffray (1975b) in Journal of Mathematical Economics.
At the same time, he was discovering, by studying Savage, what will become
his main field of research : ”Decision under Uncertainty”. He first wrote a
paper (Guesnerie and Jaffray, 1973), revisiting Savage, providing some new
pedagogical proofs and refinements. Then he took a completely new direction,
departing from Savage’s approach, based on strong ideas: the type and quantity
of available information matters and has to be explicitly taken into account in
each model. For instance, in the canonical 3 colors urn of Ellsberg (Ellsberg,
1961), there is some objective information, a point that should not be discarded.
Thus, before giving an axiomatization of preferences, one first has to focus on
the available information and find appropriate tools to represent it.
3 Jean-Yves and decision theory under non-probabilized
uncertainty
Under risk (a situation of probabilized uncertainty), the starting point to rep-
resent the available information is a probability space (S,A, P ). The problem
is more complex in a situation of non-probabilized uncertainty, when the given
information does not pin down a unique probability distribution. To better un-
derstand the problem, Jean-Yves began by studying an extreme case : the case
of total uncertainty also known as Complete Ignorance.
3.1 Decision under Complete Ignorance
Under complete ignorance, Not only does P have to be removed since there
is not enough information to single out such a probability distribution, but
the construction of the set of states S itself, is not obvious. This issue has been
addressed by Jaffray in a series of papers by the beginning of the eighties (Cohen
and Jaffray, 1980, 1983, 1985).
What does complete ignorance mean? Under complete ignorance, we have
no information whatsoever on S and we are simply left with events in A. The
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starting point of the aforementioned papers is an atomless Boolean algebra of
events, from which the sets of states of nature can be retrieved but in a non-
unique way. Hence, the first axioms proposed by Jean-Yves in his work, (Cohen
and Jaffray, 1980 and 1983) impose some consistency on the reconstruction of
S from different partitions of the sure event; then, some rationality axioms
of monotonicity and transitivity of the strict preference relation are stated,
allowing for strict preference in the case of dominance.2
(i) As a first order approximation, the characterized decision criterion takes
into account only the extremal possible outcomes of each decision, a decision
criterion akin to Arrow and Hurwicz’s criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972):
V (d) = αmd + (1− α)Md
where md and Md are the infimum and supremum outcomes of decision d, and
α is the (Hurwicz) index of Pessimism-Optimism under complete ignorance.
(ii) In Jean-Yves’ construction, effects linked to events also come into play
although only in the second order. This contrasts with Arrow-Hurwicz’s con-
struction, which requires transitivity of indifference, and thereby excludes these
second order effects. Moreover, contrary to Arrow-Hurwicz’s model, these mod-
els can be compatible with the independence axiom, but, then, the only criteria
left are maxmin and maxmax.
This study was seen by Jean-Yves as a preliminary step before studying the
intermediate case of imprecise information on events.
3.2 Between Risk and Complete Uncertainty: Imprecise
Risk
After studying complete ignorance, Jean-Yves turned to the study of a more
frequent situation of uncertainty where there exists some objective information
on the likelihood of events, but not as precise as a probability distribution. His
approach can be broken down into three steps (i) How to describe imprecise
information on events? (ii) How to model decisions in this framework? (iii)
How to evaluate decisions?
To describe imprecise information, he introduced the notions of ”Imprecise
Risk” and its special case of ”Regular Uncertainty” (Chateauneuf and Jaffray
1989 and 1995, Jaffray 1989a and 1989b). The basic idea was to bridge the gap
between various extant representations of non-probabilizable uncertainty.
3.2.1 Representing imprecise information
Jean-Yves started from the assumption that information on events is given by a
set P of probability distributions. In his view, the appropriate tools to describe
P are the lower envelope of P, denoted f , or alternatively the upper envelope
2In a recent paper, (Jaffray and Jeleva, 2010, this issue), Jean-Yves uses again some of
these axioms of complete ignorance to model preferences on a set of ”partially analyzed acts”.
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of P, denoted F,3 and especially the Mo¨bius transform4 of f , denoted φ (these
concepts were defined by Dempster, 1967 and by Shafer, 1976).
More precisely, for a set P of probabilities distributions, the lower envelope f
is defined as f = inf
P∈P
P , the upper envelope F is defined as F = sup
P∈P
P , the core
of f is the set of probability distributions that dominate f , i.e. core(f) = {P,
probability / P ≥ f} and the Mo¨bius transform φ is defined, for all B ⊂ S
( for a finite set S), by φ(B) =
∑
A⊆B(−1)|B\A|f(A), the dual formula being
f(B) =
∑
A⊆B φ(B).
Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989) characterized, through properties of their
Mo¨bius transforms, monotone capacities (on finite sets S) of finite or infinite
order and offered both new findings and easier proofs of some classical results
on lower envelopes and Mo¨bius transforms (even though the paper is technical,
it received many citations).
Jean-Yves more specifically focused on all situations in which P is generated
by a random set, in which case f is not only convex (or 2-monotone) but also
a belief function, also called a (normalized) totally monotone capacity. Such
situations are particularly tractable. Let us note that a belief function can be
characterized by the fact that its Mo¨bius transform φ is positive, i.e. for all
B ⊂ S, φ(B) ≥ 0.
Moreover, when f is a belief function, we can write, for any A ∈ A
f(A) =
∑
B∈C
φ(B)eB(A) with φ(B) ≥ 0,
∑
B∈C
φ(B) = 1,
where φ is the Mo¨bius transform of f and eB , called the elementary belief
function5 associated with B is defined by eB(A) = 1 if A ⊃ B and eB(A) = 0
if not. C is the (finite) focal set of f : C = {B ∈ B/φ(B) 6= 0}.6 Jaffray and
Wakker (1993) showed that belief functions are appropriate if and only if some
principles of complete ignorance hold.
The formula above is still true for a convex capacity, except that, in that
case, some φ(B) may be negative.
Now, as Jean-Yves himself stated, in Jaffray (1988): ”Dempster-Shafer the-
ory is of little interest for decision analysts in the absence of a complementary
decision model”, and he was one of the first to fill the gap between imprecise
information representations and decision evaluations.
3.2.2 Modeling decisions : ”Imprecise Risk”
Jaffray (1989a and 1989b) defined a situation of ”imprecise risk” by the following
two properties:
3Both are linked in the sense that, for all A in Ω, F (A) = 1−f(A). F is called the conjugate
of f (or the dual of f).
4also called Mo¨bius inverse.
5also called unanimity game.
6Note the analogy, when P is a probability distribution, with : P (A) =
∑
p(xi)δxi (A) with
p(xi) ≥ 0,
∑
p(xi) = 1, where δxi (A) = 1 if xi ∈ A and = 0 if not (Dirac measure).
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1. there exists a true probability that is only known to belong to a certain
set P of probability distributions ;
2. the lower envelope f of P characterizes P :
P = core(f) = {P/P ≥ f} and f = inf
P∈P
P ;
Jean-Yves also defined a particular case called ”regular uncertainty ” where,
moreover, the lower envelope f is convex.
3.2.3 Evaluating decisions
When it comes to modeling decisions, the starting point is a preference relation
on the set D of decisions, i.e., mappings from (S,A, f) into R, equipped with
its Borel σ−algebra B. For each d, define the image capacity fd by setting, for
each B ∈ B, fd(B) = f [d−1(B)]. Jean-Yves proved, in Jaffray (1989a), that the
fd are convex whenever f is convex and, in Jaffray (1989b), that they are belief
functions whenever f is a belief function as well. The preferences on the set of
decisions can thus be replaced by preferences on the set of capacities{fd}.7
Jean-Yves then had, at this point, the 3 ingredients to build his original
decision model :
• The properties of ”Regular Uncertainty” as stated in Chateauneuf and
Jaffray (1989 and 1995), Jaffray (1988, 1989a and 1989b);
• The representation of preferences in a situation of complete ignorance, as
stated in Cohen and Jaffray (1980), which includes the eB , elementary
belief functions ;
• The following observation : the set of convex capacities is a ”mixture set”
in the sense of Herstein-Milnor (Herstein and Milnor, 1953) and thus von
Neumann-Morgenstern’s theorem can be used.
Jaffray (1989a, 1989b, 1991a and 1991b), by adding a dominance axiom,
proposed a general decision criterion under a situation of regular uncertainty
with several special cases and some enlightening discussions.8 More precisely,
combining all the ingredients, he proceeded as follows.
First, when fd is a belief function, the decision criterion is :
V (fd) =
∑
B∈C
φd(B)V (eB) and since there is complete ignorance on each B,
the formula can be written as:
V (fd) =
∑
B∈Cd
φd(B)[α (mB ,MB)u(mB) + (1− α (mB ,MB))u(MB)]
where φd represents the Mo¨bius transform of fd, Cd is the (finite) focal set of
fd i.e.: Cd = {B∈ B/ φd(B) 6= 0},9 u the utility of the outcomes and α the
7The procedure is the same as under risk, where, with any decision (or random variable)
X, is associated the corresponding probability distributionFX .
8The paper by Gul and Pesendorfer ( 2008) is the corresponding ”Savage-style” represen-
tation of this ”vNM-style” representation of Jean-Yves.
9Let us recall that, when fd is a belief function, the φd are ≥ 0.
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(Hurwicz) index of Pessimism-Optimism under complete ignorance that, here,
can depend on the extremal outcomes of d.
Then, Jean-Yves generalized the decision criterion to the case of regular
uncertainty, where f is only convex, using the same formula, except that some
φd(B) can be negative.
In the particular case where α happens to be constant, the criterion can be
written as
V (fd) = α inf
P∈coreP
EPu(fd) + (1− α) sup
P∈coreP
EPu(fd)
This result was obtained by 1989.
The natural following question, in the case of regular uncertainty, deals with
updating. How can a new piece of information modify a given set of probabil-
ity distributions? Or said differently, how should a convex lower envelope be
updated?
3.3 Attitude toward new information
Unlike the case of additive measures, for nonadditive measures, no updating
rule satisfies all the desirable properties.10 Jaffray (1992) studied the effect of
Bayesian conditioning for a belief function, when this belief function is under-
stood as the lower envelope of compatible probability distributions.
Jean-Yves obtained the following results. First, he gave another proof of the
result of Fagin and Halpern that the lower envelope of all Bayesian conditionals
is still a belief function. Then, going beyond Fagin and Halpern (1991), he
developed an explicit expression for the mass function for the lower envelope
(this was in fact the key argument drastically simplifying the rest of the proof).
Second, he showed that, in general, the resulting ”conditional” lower envelope
does not characterize the set of all conditionals. Finally, considering only events
E such that f(E) > 0 and letting PE be the set of Bayesian conditionals of the
elements of P, Jean-Yves proved that the lower envelope fE characterizes PE
(i.e. core(fE) = PE) for all such E if and only if f is ”almost additive”, i.e.:
f(A ∩B) > 0 and f(A ∪B) < 1 implies f(A ∩B) + f(A ∪B) = f(A) + f(B)
Further results related to a convex lower envelope (more general than a
belief function) can be found in Jean-Yves’ last paper “Regular updating”
(Chateauneuf, Gajdos and Jaffray, 2010), where it can be seen, in particular,
that the condition above is less restrictive than it may seem to be at first glance.
10Two main updating rules have been proposed : the full Bayes updating rule (Fagin and
Halpern 1991, Jaffray 1992) using the infimum of all the conditional probability distributions
and the maximum likelihood updating rule of Dempster-Shafer (Dempster,1967 ; Shafer, 1976)
and Gilboa-Schmeidler (1993) using the infimum of the conditional probability distributions
only for the probability distributions giving the maximum probability to the realized event.
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3.4 Dynamic decision making
Jean-Yves also had deep thoughts about dynamic consistency issues in non-EU
models (Jaffray 1994 , Nielsen and Jaffray 2006).
Always in order to preserve an operational aspect of the model, Jean-Yves
proposed, in Nielsen and Jaffray (2006), a procedure that involves a rolling
back of the decision tree and selects a non-dominated strategy. A simulation
confirmed the computational tractability of the model.
4 Links between Choquet Expected Utility and
Jean-Yves’ model under uncertainty
Jaffray and Philippe (1997) and Philippe, Debs and Jaffray (1999) provided an
important result linking Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) and Jaffray’s model
under regular uncertainty or, more precisely, giving a behavioral foundation to
the capacity in the CEU model, under the following assumption.
Assumption: The DM is a CEU (c, u) maximizer such that his capacity c
can be written as c = αf + (1−α)F where α is a constant, f a capacity and F
its conjugate.
In this case, the CEU criterion takes the form :
CEU(fd) =
∑
B⊂Cd
φd(B)[αu(mB) + (1− α)u(MB)].
where φd is the Mo¨bius transform of fd, and mB and MB are the extremal
outcomes in B and u is the utility of outcomes.
When f is convex, this is exactly Jean-Yves’ criterion under regular un-
certainty. That is, such a CEU maximizer acts as if he was able to locate the
probabilities of the d-events in subjective probability intervals and his preferences
are represented by:
CEU(fd) = α inf
P≥f
EPu(d) + (1− α) sup
P≥f
EPu(d).
Moreover, Jean-Yves showed that the preceding assumption first is not very
restrictive11 and second can be tested.
5 Experimental results
In Jean-Yves’ view, a theory without empirical evidence was useless. So, it was
important for him to confront the model with real individual choices. As early as
the beginning of the eighties, when experimental economics was far from being
widespread, he began a series of experiments under risk and under complete
uncertainty, for gains and for losses. The purposes of these experiments were
to:
11The assumption is satisfied when the DM has an overall CEU criterion under uncertainty
and consistently adopts Expected Utility under (objective) imprecise risk.
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• assess individual attitudes under different types of uncertainty, especially
in Cohen, Jaffray and Sa¨ıd (1987) ;
• explore the link between attitudes towards gains and losses in Cohen,
Jaffray and Sa¨ıd (1987) ;
• test different decision models in Cohen and Jaffray (1988) ;
• test different updating rules in Cohen, Gilboa, Jaffray and Schmeidler
(2000).
The experiments in Cohen, Jaffray and Sa¨ıd (1987), show that attitudes
under risk and under complete uncertainty are not correlated (a result that also
appears in Cohen, Tallon and Vergnaud, 2010).
More surprisingly, the same experiments show that attitudes towards gains
and towards losses are not correlated.12 Let us note that Kahneman and Tver-
sky who found a ”reflection effect” between gains and losses in their 79 paper,
using only a between subjects design (whereas Jean-Yves’ used a within subjects
design) proposed then, in their 92 paper, two different weighting functions for
gains and losses in Cumulative Prospect Theory, based on this result.
Finally, Jean-Yves found, in Cohen and Jaffray (1988), that the certainty
effect is more important than the transformation of probability distribution
in (0, 1) and, in Cohen, Gilboa, Jaffray and Schmeidler (2000), that the Full-
Bayes updating rule is used by 2/3 of the subjects, the others mostly using the
maximum likelihood updating rule.
6 Conclusion
It is a pleasure to see Jean-Yves’ intellectual ”grandchildren” continuing to
read his papers, extracting precious scientific thought nuggets to work with,
and pursuing research in the spirit he initiated, but there is still work to be
done ...
Jean-Yves’ papers are :
• clearly and efficiently written. Jean-Yves’ rigorous mind also shows in his
writing style: in his papers, there is not a single word more than necessary!
We hope this short overview has given you the desire to read some of them
more in depth.
• not so easy to find. We can help you find them: A web-site will soon be
available at : http://jaffray.lip6.fr
Several generations of researchers are indebted to Jean-Yves for their sci-
entific vocation. His seminal works will certainly remain a major source of
inspiration for future generations in decision theory.
Acknowledgement 1 We thank Jeanie Jaffray and an anonymous referee for
valuable comments.
12Result confirmed by Abdellaoui and Munier (1992).
8
References
[1] Abdellaoui, Mohammed and Bertrand Munier (1992), ”Expected Utility
Violation : An Appropriate and Intercultural Experiment ”, in Chikan, A.
(ed.), Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory , Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
[2] Arrow, Kenneth J. and Leonid Hurwicz (1972), ”An Optimality Criterion
for Decision Making under Ignorance.” In Charles F. Carter & James L.
Ford (1972), Uncertainty and Expectations in Economics: Essays in Hon-
our of G.L.S. Shackle, 1-11, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
[3] Chateauneuf, Alain and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1989), “Some Characterizations
of Lower Probabilities and Other Monotone Capacities through the Use of
Mo¨bius Inversion,” Mathematical Social Sciences 17, 263–283.
[4] Chateauneuf, Alain and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1995), “Local Mo¨bius Trans-
forms of Monotone Capacities.”. Lectures Notes In Computer Science, Vol
946, Proceedings of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantita-
tive Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty, p 115-124.
[5] Chateauneuf, Alain, Thibault Gajdos and Jean-Yves Jaffray (2010), “Reg-
ular updating”, Theory and Decision, this issue.
[6] Cohen, Miche`le and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1980), “Rational Behavior under
Complete Ignorance,” Econometrica 48, 1281–1299.
[7] Cohen, Miche`le and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1983), “Approximations of Rational
Criteria under Complete Ignorance,” Theory and Decision 15, 121–150.
[8] Cohen, Miche`le and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1985), “Decision Making in a Case
of Mixed Uncertainty: A Normative Model,” Journal of Mathematical Psy-
chology 29, 428–442.
[9] Cohen, Miche`le and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1988), “Certainty Effect versus
Probability Distortion: An Experimental Analysis of Decision Making un-
der Risk,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance 14, 554–560.
[10] Cohen, Miche`le, Jean-Yves Jaffray, and Tanios Said (1987), “Experimental
Comparisons of Individual Behavior under Risk and under Uncertainty
for Gains and for Losses,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 39, 1–22.
[11] Cohen, Miche`le, Itzhak Gilboa, Jean-Yves Jaffray, and David Schmeidler
(2000), “An Experimental Study of Updating Ambiguous Beliefs,” Risk,
Decision, and Policy 5, 123–133.
[12] Cohen, Miche`le, Jean-Marc Tallon and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (2010):
”An experimental investigation of imprecise attitude and its relation with
risk attitude and impatience” Theory and Decision, this issue.
9
[13] Dempster, Arthur P. (1967), ”Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a
Multivalued Mapping,” Annals of Mathematical Statistics 38, 325-339.
[14] Ellsberg, Daniel (1961), ”Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 75, 643-669.
[15] Fagin, Ronald and Joseph Y. Halpern (1991), ”A New Approach to Up-
dating Beliefs.” In Piero P. Bonissone, Max Henrion, Laveen N. Kanal, &
John F. Lemmer (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 6, Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 347-374.
[16] Gilboa, Itzhak & David Schmeidler (1993), ”Updating Ambiguous Beliefs,”
Journal of Economic Theory 59, 33-49.
[17] Giraud, Raphae¨l and Jean-Marc Tallon (2010), ”Are beliefs a matter of
tastes ? A case for objective imprecise information”, Theory and Decision,
this issue.
[18] Guesnerie, Roger and Jean-Yves Jaffray, (1973), “ Probabilite´ subjec-
tive et utilite´ de vonNeumann-Morgenstern” , Bulletin de Mathe´matiques
e´conomiques, Universite´s de Paris I et Paris VI, n◦6.
[19] Gul, Faruk & Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2008), ”Measurable Ambiguity,”
Working Paper.
[20] Herstein, Israel and John Milnor (1953), ”An Axiomatic Approach to Mea-
surable Utility”, Econometrica, 21:291–297.
[21] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1974), “Existence, Proprie´te´s de Continuite´, Addi-
tivite´ de Fonctions d’Utilite´ sur un Espace Partiellement ou Totalement
Ordonne´.” Ph.D. dissertation, Universite´ de Paris VI, Paris.
[22] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1974), “On the Extension of Additive Utilities to Infi-
nite Sets,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 11, 431–452.
[23] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1975), “Existence of a Continuous Utility Function: An
Elementary Proof,” Econometrica 43, 981–983.
[24] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1975), “Semicontinuous Extension of a Partial Order,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics 2, 395–406.
[25] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1988), ”Application of linear utility theory to belief
functions”, in Uncertainty and Intelligent Systems, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, Book Series n◦313, E´d. Springer.
[26] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1989a), “Ge´ne´ralisation du Crite`re de l’Utilite´ Espe´re´e
aux Choix dans l’Incertain Re´gulier,” RAIRO-RO/Operations Research 23,
237–267.
[27] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1989b), “Linear Utility Theory for Belief Functions,”
Operations Research Letters 8, 107–112.
10
[28] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1991a), “Belief Functions, Convex Capacities, and De-
cision Making.” In Jean-Paul Doignon & Jean-Claude Falmagne (1991),
Mathematical Psychology: Current Developments, Springer, Berlin, 127–
134.
[29] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1991b), “Linear Utility Theory and Belief Functions: A
Discussion.” In Atilla Chikan (Ed.), Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk
Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[30] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1992), “Bayesian Updating and Belief Functions,”
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 22, 1144–1152.
[31] Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1994), “Dynamic Decision Making with Belief Func-
tions.” In Ronald R.Yager, Mario Fedrizzi, & Janus Kacprzyk (eds.), Ad-
vances in the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence, 331–352, Wiley, New
York.
[32] Jaffray, Jean-Yves and Meglena Jeleva (2010), “How to Deal with Partially
Analyzed Acts?,” Theory and Decision, this issue.
[33] Jaffray, Jean-Yves and Fabrice Philippe (1997), “On the Existence of Sub-
jective Upper and Lower Probabilities,” Mathematics of Operations Re-
search 22, 165–185.
[34] Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Peter P. Wakker (1993), ”Decision Making with Belief
Functions: Compatibility and Incompatibility with the Sure-Thing Princi-
ple,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7, 255-271.
[35] Nielsen, Thomas D. and Jean-Yves Jaffray (2006), “Dynamic decision mak-
ing without expected utility: an operational approach, European Journal
of Operational Research, 169(1):226246.
[36] Philippe, Fabrice, Gabriel Debs, and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1999), “Decision
Making with Monotone Lower Probabilities of Infinite Order,” Mathematics
of Operations Research 24, 767–784.
[37] Shafer, Glenn (1976), ”A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.” Princeton
University Press, Princeton NJ.
[38] Wakker, Peter, P.(2010), ”Jaffray’s ideas on ambiguity”, Theory and Deci-
sion, this issue.
11
